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Cyprus – Should the UN withdraw 
Ban Ki Moon’s long awaited progress report on the negotiations in Cyprus did not come up with a 
final recommendation on how long the United Nations will be committed to engage in Cyprus.1 
However, he warned that the UN would not continue indefinitely to spend efforts and money on a 
process that does not seem to render any progress.  
Indeed there is not much to suggest that a negotiated solution is anywhere close to be concluded in 
the foreseeable future. This appears strange as on the onset the past three years have seen the most 
intensive and most comprehensive negotiation process ever. 
Jan Asmussen, April 2011 
ECMI Issue Brief #25 
 
Following a period of silence after the 
failure of the Annan-Plan and throughout 
the Presidency of Tassos Papadopoulos, 
intensive rounds of talks were conducted by 
Greek Cypriot leader Dimitris Christofias 
and the Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali 
Talat, who was followed by his successor 
Derviş Eroğlu. 
During the negotiations most of the well 
known disputed topics have been discussed 
in intensive rounds at high and expert 
levels. As the principle of “nothing is agreed 
until everything is agreed” persists, no 
concrete progress has been reported from 
the negotiations. However, despite existing 
agreements on secrecy much has been 
leaked – often apparently deliberately – to 
the press that has covered some of the 
topics discussed. The indication is that little 
progress has been achieved on virtually any 
of the areas that were already at the 
forefront of controversy during the Annan-
Plan period. 
If this is the case, the underlying question is 
why so much time has been spent on a 
process that does not seem to be leading 
toward a successful conclusion. 
In order to assess this question one needs to 
ask a couple of interrelated questions, such 
as how a desired future solution should be 
devised for the respective communities. Is 
there a real desire to change the current 
political system on behalf of the Greek 
Cypriot community? Does the Turkish 
Cypriot community really wish to enter a 
multi-cultural political set-up in which it 
shall play a minority role albeit one that will 
include extensive participation rights? What 
are the interests of external actors, notably 
Turkey, the European Union and the United 
States of America? Finally, are there push 
factors that would make a solution possible 
or might there be an overarching interest 
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that unites various actors in the secret 
desire to perpetuate the situation and 
preserve the so called “Cyprus Problem”? 
 
The Cyprus Impasse (2004-2007) 
The failure of the Annan-Plan marked a 
preliminary end to international solution 
diplomacy.2 General sentiment was that any 
future initiative should be initiated in 
Cyprus and “local owned.” However, no real 
meaningful local initiatives came to the 
surface during the remainder of Tassos 
Papadopoulos term in office. 
In 2006 the UN had tried to reinitiate the 
process in what became known as the 
Gambari Process, named after UN Under-
Secretary General Ibrahim Gambari. Talat 
and Papadopoulos met more than 50 times 
without reaching any agreement.3 
In the end there were strong indications 
that the UN might withdraw from Cyprus 
altogether if Papadopoulos were to be 
reelected. The impasse on the Cyprus issue 
was evident in a speech given by UNFICYP 
chief of Mission Michael Møller which 
expressed the UN’s growing impatience 
with the lack of movement in a speech early 
February 2008. He said the length of 
UNFICYP’s mission and the continuing lack 
of progress gave rise to a number of 
legitimate questions. UNFICYP was often 
asked how much longer the international 
community would wait for a settlement, and 
what more the force could do in Cyprus 
after more than four decades. He also hinted 
that UN resources on Cyprus could be put to 
better use elsewhere. Møller said that it all 
boiled down to whether the necessary 
political will existed among the leaders of 
both communities in Cyprus to sit down and 
negotiate seriously to find a solution.4 In the 
event, Tassos Papadopoulos came in only 
third in the first round of elections held on 
17 February 2008.5 
 
New Hope? Electoral Change in South 
Cyprus 
The final round of elections was won by 
Dimitris Christofias, the leader of the 
communist AKEL, who pledged to re-launch 
negotiations with his Turkish Cypriot 
counterpart Mehmet Ali Talat. Addressing a 
crowed outside his campaign quarters he 
said: “From tomorrow we join our forces, 
work collectively and with unity to achieve 
the reunification of our country.”6 
On 21 March 2008 Talat and Christofias 
agreed on a fresh start for negotiations and 
in May they clarified the aim of establishing 
a “bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with 
political equality, as defined by relevant 
Security Council resolutions. This 
partnership will have a Federal Government 
with a single international personality, as 
well as a Turkish Cypriot Constituent State 
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and a Greek Cypriot Constituent State, 
which will be of equal status.”7 
Both leaders declared on 1 July 2008 that 
they had agreed “in principle” on the issues 
of single sovereignty and citizenship. Their 
commitment was further reiterated in a 
statement on 1 July 2008 saying that the 
“aim of the full-fledged negotiations is to 
find a mutually acceptable solution to the 
Cyprus problem which will safeguard the 
fundamental and legitimate rights and 
interests of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The 
agreed solution will be put to separate 
simultaneous referenda.”8 
As a first symbol for the new spirit of 
reconciliation, Christofias and Talat opened 
a new crossing point in the old town of 
Nicosia at Ledra Street. This street had been 
closed during the troubles in 1963/64. Its 
opening was indeed seen as a sign that 
times were changing in Cyprus.9 
Unfortunately, the pompous opening of the 
Ledra barricade was not followed by the 
speedy opening of other check points. 
Instead it took the leaders until 14 October 
2010 to open the Limnitis/Yeşilirmak 
crossing that links the villages of 
Limnitis/Yeşilirmak and Kato Pyrgos.10 
Another encouraging development seemed 
to be reestablishment of so-called “technical 
committees. Technical committees 
comprised of government officials from 
both sides had first been established during 
the Annan-Plan period but were dissolved 
after the referenda. The 22 April 2008 saw 
the installment of six working groups and 
seven technical committees. The working 
groups dealt with issues of governance, 
European Union, security and guarantees, 
territory, property and economy. Their main 
task was to reach convergence in the main 
areas and to highlight the differences that 
could then be addressed at the high level 
talks. The technical committees were 
formed around practical matters affecting 
the daily life of Cypriots. They were tasked 
to confront criminal matters, economy, 
cultural heritage, crisis management, 
humanitarian issues, health and 
environment. The main rationale for their 
existence was to increase confidence 
between the communities through concrete 
measures that would improve cooperation. 
Six official negotiation chapters were 
defined. Those were governance and power-
sharing, EU matters, economy, property, 
territory, security and guarantees. A seventh 
chapter on Citizenship and settlers on which 
the Greek Cypriots were very keen was not 
officially included.11 
The intensive and full-fledged negotiations 
started on 3 September 2008. Already a 
month later the leaders had completed a 
first round of issues that included 
governance and power-sharing, economic 
affairs, European Union, property, territory, 
and security. The speedy and intensive 
process led many observers to believe that 
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this time both sides meant business and 
were committed to finding a lasting solution 
in a foreseeable period of time. It soon 
became clear that these hopes were not 
being fulfilled as easy as it seemed. 
 
No Progress in the talks 
Early indications that the talks would 
encounter difficulties became apparent even 
before they actually started. Dimitris 
Christofias was heading a shaky coalition 
government that included hard-line 
politicians. Partly for this reason, he seemed 
to return to rhetoric that resembled those of 
the Papadopoulos era and endangered the 
talks from the start.12  
The International Crisis Group listed moves 
by Christofias that slowed the talks that 
included:  
forming a coalition government with 
rejectionist parties, and not reaching 
out to the pro-compromise main 
opposition party; rejecting the 
Annan Plan as a textual basis for 
discussion; travelling frequently 
when Turkish Cypriots were ready 
to push ahead with talks; frequently 
blaming Turkey for all the problems 
on the island even though Turkey 
was supporting the talks; failing to 
give significant sup-port to Talat in 
the north Cypriot elections; and 
appearing reluctant to stimulate 
Greek Cypriot enthusiasm for the 
talks.13 
Balancing between nationalist attacks and 
keeping the talks at bay proved to be a 
difficult task for Christofias, who often 
seemed to water down publicly what had 
seemed to be achieved at the negotiating 
table.14 
For his part, Mehmet Ali Talat continued to 
have the support of Turkish President Recep 
Tayip Erdoĝan, who remained in charge of 
Turkish politics despite the attempted 
closure of his party in summer 2008.15  
Despite negative press coverage, the talks 
continued in intensive mode. Apart from 
frequent meetings of the leaders, Christofias 
and Talat appointed the special 
representatives George Iacovou and Özdil 
Nami, who would meet even more often to 
discuss details and prepare the ground for 
the high-level talks. 
Unfortunately, the number of meetings did 
not correspond with the amount of gaps 
breached. Christofias and Talat alone held 
70 meetings. They managed to agree on EU 
matters as well as on economy and made 
twenty-two classifications of disputed 
property. There was no real progress on 
citizenship, apart from Christofias’ public 
announcement that he would be prepared 
to accept up to 50,000 settlers from Turkey 
to become Cypriot citizens. No formal 
discussion on territory, security and 
guarantees took place because the Turkish 
Cypriots and Turkey insisted to leave this 
open until the end of the negotiations. 16 
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It became more and more clear that no 
progress was made on most vital issues. 
Turkish-Cypriots had laid much hope on a 
process that was expected to lead them to 
the perceived benefits of European Union 
membership. Much of the esteem that had 
led to the mass protests and downfall of the 
Denktaş regime that had dominated 
Turkish-Cypriot politics for decades now 
gave way to deep felt disappointment and 
frustration. On the domestic front Talat’s 
CTP party did not deliver on their economic 
promises. Instead it appeared that the same 
nepotism that had ruined the political 
culture before was carried on just by 
replacing the members of the old regime 
with those stemming from CTP.17 Coupled 
with slow progress at the negotiations this 
led to a rapid decline of Talat’s popularity. 
Subsequent communal and parliamentary 
elections in 2006 and 2009 were lost by the 
CTP.18 
An increasingly nervous Talat urged 
Christofias several times to speed up the 
negotiating process in order to produce 
tangible results. A second “reading phase” 
that started in September 2009 was 
initiated with the view to increase 
convergence. According to Ban Ki Moon’s 
report from November 2010, a number of 
important convergences had been achieved 
in the areas of governance and power-
sharing, as well as in EU related issues and 
Economy. Joint papers and bridging 
proposals had been drafted to prepare for 
intensified talks that started in early 2010. 
On governance and power-sharing the 
Greek Cypriot side has agreed on a rotating 
presidency while the Turkish Cypriote side 
was prepared to accept cross-voting.19 
A joint statement issued by the leaders on 1 
February 2010 read that “with goodwill and 
determination, we can achieve a solution in 
the shortest possible time.” Both leaders 
warned that “time is not on the side of the 
settlement.”20 These talks that lasted for six 
full days in January and February produced 
nothing concrete. Yet, Ban Ki Moon judged 
that the papers produced by the sides were 
“valuable in providing detailed opening 
positions and acted as a starting point for 
the negotiations around specific issues 
under consideration.”21 As this evaluation 
could hardly have been seen as an 
optimistic one, Ban Ki Moon decided to 
travel to Cyprus in early 2010 in order to 
encourage the leaders to reach some 
progress before the Turkish Cypriot 
presidential elections. 
Towards the end of the electoral campaign – 
and with Talat’s inevitable defeat at hand – 
Christofias showed more flexibility. Ban Ki 
Moon reported that both leaders had made 
steady progress. On 30 March 2010 during a 
final meeting Talat and Christofias stressed 
again that they could reach a comprehensive 
settlement. The problem was that only few 
people in Cyprus really continued to believe 
in the success of the process. 
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The end? Electoral Change in North 
Cyprus 
As a result, Talat suffered a solemn defeat in 
the Presidential election in the North on 18 
April 2010. Gaining just 42.85 per cent of 
the votes he lost to the conservative veteran 
politician Derviş Eroĝlu, who received 50.38 
per cent.22 The election of Eroĝlu, an ardent 
conservative who had strongly opposed the 
Annan-Plan in 2004, was regarded by many 
observers as marking the final death knell to 
the negotiations. However, there were two 
reasons why these evaluations were wrong: 
First, Eroĝlu was elected on domestic i.e. 
Turkish Cypriot internal reasons described 
above. Opinion polls during election period 
clearly indicated that the majority of 
Turkish Cypriots still supported a solution 
on the basis of that plan. Therefore, Eroĝlu 
refrained from demanding a withdrawal 
from Turkish-Cypriot commitments and 
vowed to respect the will of the people. 
Second, and possibly even more decisive, 
Turkey obviously pressed Eroĝlu from the 
beginning not to endanger the negotiation 
process by irresponsible statements.23 As a 
result Eroĝlu announced immediately after 
his election that he believed that he would 
reach an agreement with Christofias within 
a “certain time period.”24 He promised as 
well that he would take a constructive 
stance and would work within the “UN 
parameters”.25  
The talks continue 
The talks continued from May 2010 in the 
same format as their forerunners. Eroĝlu’s 
chose a new special representative, Kudret 
Ozersay, a young international lawyer who 
had been on Talat’s negotiation team at 
Bürgenstock. This was seen as further 
evidence that Eroĝlu would not end the 
talks. Moreover, he proclaimed that a 
solution was attainable by the end of 2010.26 
The meetings remained Cypriot-led and 
Cypriot owned. The UN was mainly 
represented by an observer who took note 
of the progress but did not interfere into the 
process. From September 2008 to 
November 2010 the leaders met 88 times. 
29 meetings dealt with governance and 
power-sharing and 25 on property. Eight 
meetings were held on economic issues and 
six times both leaders discussed citizenship, 
immigration, aliens and asylum. Five 
meetings were allocated to European Union 
matters; four were held on territory i.e. on 
the final map and two on security and 
guarantees.27 Despite the frequency of the 
talks indications were that most issues were 
far from solved. 
 
UN runs out of patience 
On 4 June, The UN Secretary Generals 
Special Representative to Cyprus, Alexander 
Downer, gave a quite undiplomatic and 
open judgement on the prospects for a 
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solution. He said that “if the people of 
Cyprus, Greek Cypriots and Turkish 
Cypriots, want a settlement they will 
achieve it. If they do not want one, it is clear 
they will not get one... This is an agreement 
which is within the reach of the leaders... 
But the question is whether people want it 
or not, not the leaders alone, but whether 
the public want it or not. The future of this 
country is in your hands.” This was a clear 
message that Greek Cypriot commentator 
Loucas Charalambous rightly interpreted in 
saying “What he was really saying was: ‘If 
you fools seriously believe that we will 
pander to you for much longer you are 
making a big mistake. If you do not want to 
solve your problem it is your choice. We, 
however, do not intend to stay here and put 
up with your petty antics for much longer.’” 
Only a Russian veto prevented the inclusion 
of a formal deadline into the Security 
Council resolution on Cyprus.28 The fact that 
13 members had backed it must however 
have been interpreted to mean that the 
International community’s patience was 
wearing thin.29 
The hardly covered threat that the UN might 
withdraw from Cyprus altogether was 
frequently communicated to the negotiating 
factions.  
The Eroĝlu-Christofias negotiations in 2010 
centered mainly on property issues. 
Previously the sides had only agreed on a 
joint paper on categories of affected 
property. Both sides produced new 
proposals and tried subsequently to bridge 
the gaps between them. Ban Ki Moon 
reported that “since May 2010 the leaders 
have met on the property issue 15 times, 
including two all-day meetings, one during 
the August break. In addition, the 
representatives and experts met 21 times to 
advance the property discussions at the 
more technical level.”30 
This frequency did not match the 
expectations regarding the marrying of the 
proposals. Instead, Alexander Downer 
reported in November 2010 on a “worrying 
lack of progress in efforts to agree on a 
conceptual framework on property”. 31  
The main reported differences on the 
property chapter were 
a. Greek Cypriot insistence that all 
former property holders should be 
able to choose among exchange, 
compensation or reinstatement; and 
b. the Turkish-Cypriot position that 
since between 70 and 80 per cent of 
the property in the north is Greek 
Cypriots owned a total 
reinstatement would make 
bizonality impossible. Therefore, 
they insisted on a limit on 
reinstatement.  
Ban Ki Moon warned in his November 
report that the leaders would “have to 
reconcile these and other seemingly 
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irreconcilable issues across all six chapters”. 
32  
In addition, the lack of implementation of 
confidence-building measures is mirrored 
by the fact that at the negotiations out of 
twenty-tree measures that were agreed 
upon by the technical committees only six 
were implemented.33 
The talks got stuck even on procedural 
matters, as the Greek Cypriots insisted 
linking the property discussions to the 
territory chapter. Instead, Turkish Cypriots 
demanded a multilateral conference that 
would include the two parties and the 
guarantor powers Greece, Turkey and 
Britain. This is unacceptable to the Greek 
Cypriots, who regard the Treaty of 
Guarantee as null and void. Turkish 
Cypriots, on the other hand, insist on the 
continuation of the Treaty even after a 
solution has been found. 
Ban Ki Moon, who had noted the slow 
process, became increasingly impatient and 
urged the leaders in phone calls on 21 
October 2010 “to achieve concrete advances 
in the current discussions on property in 
order to maintain momentum in the peace 
process”. 34 Both leaders were subsequently 
invited to New York where on 18 November 
the Secretary General confronted them with 
a list of “several core issues” on which he 
“asked the leaders to work on (…) and to 
“report back to (him) on progress at the end 
of January”. 35 
In December the Security Council joined Ban 
in expressing “concern at the slow pace of 
progress in recent months.” It stressed “that 
the status quo (was) unsustainable and that 
there now exist(ed) a unique opportunity to 
make decisive progress in a timely fashion. 
It “strongly urg(ed) the leaders to increase 
the momentum in the negotiations to ensure 
the full exploitation of this opportunity to 
reach an enduring, comprehensive and just 
settlement.” The Council indicated that 
“decisive progress” could be attained “in the 
near future”.36 No progress was made until 
the 26 January meeting, were Ban could 
only report that the leaders would 
reconvene “soon”.37 Ban warned that the 
talks could not be an open-ended process; 
that a critical window of opportunity was 
rapidly closing. Criticizing the lack of 
progress he sensed that “talks for the sake 
of talks are ultimately not productive”.38  
Ban in his April report to the Security 
Council reported some progress in the areas 
of Economy and EU. But on the core issues 
of dispute property, territory, and security 
no significant developments could be 
recorded.39 
 
What are the obstacles? 
Ban Ki Moon has noted that while the 
leaders showed a constructive and collegial 
approach at the negotiations, they often had 
returned to negative public rhetoric. 
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Throughout the process, he complained that 
“political leaders, both in government and 
opposition, have accused the other side of 
undermining the talks.”40 He equally 
criticized the “near-total official secrecy of 
the negotiations” as having not “not been 
helpful on the public front. “ Instead, 
selected details were leaked to the press. 
This would have left the public largely in the 
dark about what was going on in the 
negotiations. He warned that this way one 
might “potentially face an unprepared and 
unreceptive public at the time of the 
referendums.”41 
It is strange that the Secretary-General 
failed – or at least appears to be failing – to 
understand that this kind of negotiation 
tactics is exactly a feature of the Cyprus 
political negotiation circus from its very 
start in 1968. The real question is whether 
the underlying logic of the negotiations is 
not to come to a successful solution that will 
be endorsed in referenda, but to 
institutionalize a negotiation process that 
secures the persistence of the so-called 
“Cyprus Problem.” 
In this respect it is worth mentioning that 
the main obstacles that were leaked to the 
press and appeared as well in the Secretary 
General’s report are issues that are to be 
solved in the immediate period following a 
solution: The chapters on property, 
territory, and guarantees. 
Most of the discussions seem to concentrate 
on the amount of property Greek Cypriots 
will be able to reclaim, the final boundaries 
of the Turkish Cypriot constituent state, and 
the question of international guarantees 
that a final settlement will be honoured by 
both parties. These are important questions. 
However, these questions will not 
determine how successful a future united 
Cyprus will be. There has been no serious 
public discussion on governance i.e. the 
functioning of the state. The only issue that 
has popped up occasionally was that of the 
actual amount of autonomy the federal 
states will have. This was mainly a 
repercussion of previous disputes regarding 
confederation vs. federation which is a 
phantom debate since federation had 
already been agreed on in 1977.  
One cannot but wonder how serious both 
sides are, if they fail to engage in meaningful 
discussions on how the two communities 
will re-establish a common state that would 
not have difficulties to even redevelop 
common means of day-to-day 
communication.42 
 
What do the Cypriots want? 
Recent opinion polls show an increasing 
scepticism regarding a possible successful 
conclusion of the negotiations. At the same 
time few of the Cypriots interviewed believe 
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that “the other side” would honour an 
agreement once it is reached.  
While both sides continue to claim that they 
want a solution to the Cyprus Problem, the 
perceptions of how such a solution should 
look like are quite divergent. A majority of 
Greek Cypriots supports a unitary state 
(92%), while the majority of Turkish-
Cypriots would prefer to settle for a two-
state solution (90%). The federal model, the 
only solution that is on the table, is a mere 
second best option supported by respective 
79%/76%. However, only few Greek-
Cypriots would agree to the permanent 
partition (38%) or prefer the continuation 
of the status quo (37%). Turkish Cypriots 
claim that they prefer the status quo (64%) 
to a solution based on the Greek 
interpretation of federation (53%).43 The 
divergent opinions have their impact on the 
amount of private interaction and visits 
between the two communities which is 
declining. The number of crossings by 
Cypriots to the other side fell by 8 per cent 
from April 2009 to April 2010, while mutual 
trade dropped by 16.8 per cent. Greek 
Cypriots travelling north in the year to 30 
April 2010 fell to 670,910 from 730,310; 
Turkish Cypriots crossing south fell to 
1,185,073 from 1,287,126. The total value of 
mutual trade was about €5.2 million, down 
from €6.1 million.44 
Looking at these numbers, one cannot but 
wonder what Cypriots really want. As most 
Cypriots do answer favourably to the 
question that they want a negotiated 
solution we must try to look behind the 
political cultures that preclude open 
departure from positions that are seen as 
imperative for national survival. The Greek 
Cypriot preference for a unitary state is 
actually equivalent to the Turkish Cypriot 
one of agreed partition. Both sides do not 
show any overt desire to share a common 
state, political system, and, last but not least, 
economy. When Greek Cypriots talk about a 
unitary state it would be one that would be 
dominated by the Greek Cypriot majority. 
The Turkish Cypriots would have minority 
rights as elsewhere in Europe, but would 
not be able to force their agendas against 
the will of the majority. 
The Turkish Cypriots on their part hope to 
gain independence from the present 
dependence on Turkey and hope that after 
an agreed partition they would be able as 
EU members to benefit from European 
prosperity. They do fear that in a unitary 
state they would be sidelined and 
marginalized by successful Greek Cypriot 
enterprises that would have the support of a 
Greek Cypriot dominated administration. 
The dilemma of having to choose between 
Turkey and Greek-Cypriots has dominated 
much of the Turkish-Cypriot solution 
debate. The major shift in public opinion 
that took place in Northern Cyprus in the 
years surrounding the Annan-Plan was 
related to economic troubles in Turkey that 
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had direct repercussions in Cyprus. One of 
the major problems of Turkish Cypriot 
economy is that a disproportionately high 
number of employees work for the public 
sector that can never be fully subsidized by 
domestic tax revenues. As a result, Turkey is 
subsidizing the core of the public sector 
salaries in Northern Cyprus. Subsequently, 
Turkey is reserving the right of interfering 
into internal affairs at most major levels. 
Many Turkish Cypriots hoped that by 
entering a United Cyprus in 2004 that would 
escape the dependence on Turkey and enter 
a more diverse system of European 
sponsorship. There were surprisingly few 
discussions on whether the present level of 
public employment and expenditure could 
be kept in a United Cyprus and who would 
have to pay for it. As the Turkish economy 
recovered and prospered in the years 
following the failure of the Annan-Plan, 
Turkish Cypriot public wages increased as 
well and public protests against Turkish 
interference diminished significantly.  
This has now changed as Turkey has 
decided to cut down on public expenditures 
in Northern Cyprus. On January 2011 the 
TRNC government – following pressure 
from Ankara – adopted a huge austerity 
package that would cut civil service salaries 
by up to forty per cent, change the 
promotions system and privatize state-
owned corporations such as electricity, 
telecommunications and the largest 
University (EMU). Again this led to huge 
protests on 28 January and 2 March in 
which up to 30 000 Turkish Cypriots 
demonstrated against the package.45 While 
these protests were interpreted by some 
observers as signs for Turkish-Cypriot 
willingness to shake-off Turkeys influence 
on the island, most indicators suggest the 
Cyprus Mail’s commentator was right 
alleging that had “Ankara carried on picking 
up the tab, nobody would be on the streets 
protesting against Turkey’s interference and 
expressing a yearning for re-unification.”46 
The protests are not born out of a genuine 
wish to find a solution to the Cyprus 
problem, but stem from understandable 
worries about the economic future of 
Turkish-Cypriot families. 
Judging Greek and Turkish Cypriot desires 
for a settlement, their action prompts one to 
wonder if the opinion polls do not lack one 
important question: While the questioners 
do prompt the Cypriots to state that they do 
wish to see a solution to the Cyprus 
problem, they were not asked how much 
they actually desire such a solution. In other 
words, do Cypriots really desperately wish 
to see an alternation or disruption of their 
present lives?  
The absence of large scale pro-solution 
manifestations on the Greek-Cypriot and the 
clear economy driven character of the 
Turkish Cypriot ones do not support the 
notion that Cypriots are desperate to see 
reunification in their lifetime. 
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Limited Prospects for the “classic” 
solution 
A classic solution would be a negotiated 
agreement between the two Cypriot leaders 
on the ground of the UN parameters. It 
would result in a federal, bi-communal 
United Republic of Cyprus consisting of 
Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot 
constituent states. The likelihood of a 
breakthrough seems to be next to zero. Ban 
Ki Moon himself has downplayed hopes of a 
solution in 2011: ”The political environment 
in the second quarter of 2011 will likely not 
be conducive to constructive negotiations. 
Parliamentary elections in the south are 
scheduled for May, while elections will be 
held in Turkey in June.” 47While Ban is 
certainly right in asserting that the prospect 
in 2011 are bleak, there is little evidence out 
there that chances are any better in the 
years to follow. 
 
Prospects for an alternative solution 
The UN and other international actors have 
frequently showed signs of fatigue with the 
Cyprus Problem. The ICG reported UN 
statements indicating that it was 
considering changes to “mandate, force 
levels and concept of operations” depending 
on “developments on the ground”. This 
could include the closure of the good offices 
mission. Another option discussed would be 
the reduction of UNFICYP force level. At 
present there are 850 military personal and 
60 police officers of the UN Peacekeeping 
Force (UNFICYP).48 The International Crisis 
Group opposes such a move, arguing that 
the UN “remains the sole authorised 
facilitator of the talks. Special 
Representative Downer has the parties’ 
confidence to shuttle between Ankara, 
Athens and Nicosia. He and his team should 
encourage the exploration of interim steps, 
including preparations for the re-
construction of Varosha and verification of 
troop numbers.”49 In the light of the lacking 
progress the ICG proposes a set of 
confidence building six interim measures 
that would help to keep the negotiations 
going. 
The group proposes that: 
1. Turkey should open its ports and 
airports to Greek Cypriot sea and air 
traffic and Greek Cypriots should 
allow the port of Famagusta to 
handle trade with the EU under 
Turkish Cypriot management50 and 
EU supervision and end their 
practice of blocking Turkey’s EU 
negotiating chapters 
2. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots 
should hand back the fenced area of 
Varosha to its Greek Cypriot owners, 
subject to a UN interim regime that 
oversees reconstruction.  
3. Greek Cypriots should allow charter 
flights to Ercan Airport in the 
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Turkish Cypriot zone, monitored by 
the EU.  
4. The actual troop numbers on the 
island should be verified and a 
census be conducted to determine 
the exact population of the island 
and the legal status of its 
inhabitants. 
5. Greek Cypriots should cooperate 
with Turkish Cypriot administrative 
entities, pending a political 
settlement. Turkish officials should 
meet with Greek Cypriot officials, 
and Turkish Cypriots should be 
supportive.  
6. The European Commission, 
supported by the EU Presidency, 
should continue to serve as an 
honest broker to secure agreement 
on interim steps. Leaders of EU 
member states should avoid 
partisan statements at a time when 
UN talks continue and no one party 
is being clearly obstructive.51 
While these measures “would change little 
of the bi-zonal, bi-communal realities on the 
ground”, the ICG argues they would “reduce 
tensions, normalise relations between all 
parties, build a sense of trust and pave the 
way to a full political settlement.”52 
This is most probably true, but the real 
questions are: 
a) if these measures would 
reinvigorate the negotiations; and  
b) if the negotiations will discontinue 
because no additional confidence 
building measures are implemented. 
 
The Crisis Group argues that implementing 
the Additional Protocol would” put anti-
Turkey Greek Cypriot and European 
hardliners on the defensive (and) clear its 
EU negotiation path for years”. 53 This is 
based on the assumption that the Cyprus 
problem is the real stumbling block 
hindering Turkey’s accession. The Crisis 
Group senses that EU Turkey-skeptics 
would “hide behind Cyprus, sometimes even 
forcing the Greek Cypriots (and Greece) to 
act just to keep the EU-Turkey process “54 
However, it fails to turn this argument 
around in the sense that a positive solution 
to the Cyprus problem would not really alter 
the opposition to enlargement. German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel’s ill-intended visit 
to Cyprus exemplified that those opposed to 
Turkey’s EU membership aspirations are 
not interested in a solution but in a 
persistence of the Cyprus problem in order 
to prevent Turkey joining the Union.55 
Turkey has shown considerable flexibility 
during the Annan-Plan period. It continues 
to back a negotiated solution. Turkey’s main 
incentive is European Union membership. 
However, as disillusionment with the EU is 
rising, support for a solution that would 
effectively diminish Turkey’s control over 
the north is waning.  
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The ICG has basically sensed that the lack of 
confidence and confidence building is due to 
political stubbornness on both sides: 
Greek Cypriots believe the slightest 
international engagement with 
Turkish Cypriots qualifies as 
recognition of their separate 
communal identity or de facto 
sovereignty and would make them 
lose interest in a federal settlement. 
Similarly, Turkish Cypriots who 
want a closely integrated federation 
oppose interim steps lest Greek 
Cypriots become more satisfied with 
the status quo and their community 
be left stranded. But doing nothing 
has produced exactly this result 
anyway: loss of interest in the talks, 
deepening partition and fatalistic 
acceptance of the status quo. By 
contrast, any one confidence-
building step would help build 
dialogue and trust and without 
removing mutual suspicion, there 
seems little hope of a political 
settlement.56 
 
What the ICG – and much of the 
international community – fails to 
appreciate is that the Cypriots are not 
stubbornly preventing a solution that is in 
their interest but diligently working to 
preserve a process that has been part of 
their political culture for many years and 
that has proven beneficial for much of the 
political leadership and a great deal for the 
population, as well. 
The ICG describes the UN-facilitated 
negotiations as the “only way to achieve an 
over-all political settlement, to solve the 
ultimate status and size of the Turkish 
Cypriot zone, to establish full diplomatic 
relations between Turkey and the Republic 
of Cyprus, to work out the amount of 
territory that Turkey and Turkish Cypriots 
will hand over to the Greek Cypriots and to 
agree on the property owned on both sides 
of the island. Therefore,” it urges” they must 
continue”.57 
Ahmet Sözen has recently argued that in the 
light of the lack of progress at the 
negotiations the UN should even play a 
larger role and update its mission of good 
offices to a level where it could put forward 
bridging proposals itself. He links this to a 
demand for a firm deadline (end of 2011) 
for the end of negotiations and the holding 
of referenda.58 The problem with this 
approach is that it has already been tested 
unsuccessfully with the Annan-Plan where 
gaps were filled by the Secretary General 
and a firm date for referenda was imposed. 
The result was the rejection on behalf of the 
Greek-Cypriot majority.59 
 
What is really needed is a test of Cypriot 
sincerity toward a solution. If decades of 
solution talks have shown us one thing it is 
that international interference surrounding 
the negotiations has not resulted in a 
solution. 
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As it is one of the main demands of the 
Greek-Cypriot side that the process should 
be Cypriot owned, the UN should now 
prepare for living up to this process by 
announcing withdrawal from its mission 
from Cyprus by the end of 2011. 
If the Greek and Turkish Cypriots want a 
solution all options are still at their disposal. 
The EU stands by with a mission in Cyprus 
to help with the legal details of 
implementation and the UN can still provide 
expertise were needed. 
What the UN should stop to engage in is 
giving an umbrella to a theater that has 
been dragging on for far too long and that – 
despite the intensiveness that it had over 
the past three years – resembles the 
negative rhetoric and the shambles that 
have characterized Cyprus talks since 1968.  
As it appears, Ban Ki Moon’s concealed 
threats of reviewing the situation and claims 
that the process cannot be an open ended 
one do not filter down as to be taken 
seriously by the parties involved. As the 
Secretary-General has already agreed to a 
new tripartite meeting in June it is rather 
unlikely that he is going to put firm 
deadlines in front of the Cypriot leaders.60 
If the Cypriots truly want a solution they 
still have all cards in their hands – all 
options have been discussed and various 
scenarios are on the table. What is needed is 
a determined effort on behalf of the leaders 
to bridge the gaps. 
Alternatively, both sides should be bold 
enough to engage in an honest discussion 
with all quarters of the society if unification 
is really what people want. 
Ban Ki Moon has again warned that the 
process cannot be open ended and that he 
would make a “broader assessment of the 
United Nations presence in Cyprus”. 
However, it does not seem that the leaders 
take this covert threat of UN withdrawal 
seriously. Therefore, the UN should realize 
that its continued presence in Cyprus 
apparently helps to perpetuate the Cyprus 
problem rather than to solve it.  
 
Policy recommendations 
 The UN Secretary-General should 
announce an end of the good offices 
mission by the end of 2011 at the 
latest. 
 The UN should review the actual 
need continuation of its peace 
keeping force in Cyprus. Given the 
absence of actual violent incidence 
on the island and the multitude of 
worldwide trouble spots it might 
well decide to downgrade it to an 
observation mission. 
 The confidence-building measures 
suggested by the ICG will not help 
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nor hinder the negotiation process. 
They should nevertheless been 
implemented as they would all 
contribute to peace, trust and 
security on the island 
 Greek and Turkish Cypriot political 
parties, civil society actors and 
media have to engage in honest 
discussions as to what they perceive 
as the preferable vision for the 
future of the island. If a multicultural 
and bi-communal federation is not 
the preferred options alternative 
models have to be seriously 
considered. 
 The International community cannot 
help in this process – it’s continued 
interference, albeit on Cypriot 
request and insistence – is 
perpetuating the negotiation 
process a permanent feature of 
Cypriot political culture.
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